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Abstract
The authors estimate a sticky-price dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with a ﬁnancial
accelerator, à la Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), to assess the importance of ﬁnancial
frictions in the ampliﬁcation and propagation of the effects of transitory shocks. Structural
parameters of two models, one with and one without a ﬁnancial accelerator, are estimated using a
maximum-likelihood procedure and post-1979 U.S. data. The estimation and simulation results
provide some quantitative evidence in favour of the ﬁnancial-accelerator model. The ﬁnancial
accelerator appears to play an important role in investment ﬂuctuations, but its importance for
output depends on the nature of the initial shock.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, E37, E44
Bank classification: Business fluctuations and cycles; Economic models; Econometric and
statistical methods
Résumé
Les auteurs estiment un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique et stochastique où les prix sont
rigides et qui intègre un mécanisme d’accélérateur ﬁnancier, à la Bernanke, Gertler et Gilchrist
(1999), aﬁn d’évaluer l’importance des frictions ﬁnancières dans l’ampliﬁcation et la propagation
des effets des chocs transitoires. Les paramètres structurels des deux modèles étudiés (dont l’un
comporte un mécanisme d’accélérateur ﬁnancier et l’autre pas) sont estimés au moyen de la
méthode du maximum de vraisemblance à partir de données américaines remontant jusqu’à 1979.
Les résultats des estimations et des simulations effectuées sont favorables, en termes quantitatifs,
au modèle de l’accélérateur ﬁnancier. Ce mécanisme semble jouer un rôle déterminant dans les
ﬂuctuations de l’investissement, mais son importance du point de vue de la production dépend de
la nature du choc initial.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E32, E37, E44
Classification de la Banque : Cycles et fluctuations économiques; Modèles économiques; Méthodes
économétriques et statistiques1. Introduction
Policy-makers, academics, and the business media often follow and discuss credit
market conditions extensively. Newspaper stories highlighting the impending e®ects
of \tight" or \easy" credit are common. The regular public communications of cen-
tral banks analyze interest rate spreads or discuss recent trends in the growth of
business lending. This discussion re°ects a view that the ability of ¯rms to obtain
¯nancing plays an active role in investment behaviour. Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
show that the presence of asymmetric information in credit markets can give the bal-
ance sheet conditions of borrowers a role to play in the business cycle through their
impact on the cost of external ¯nance. The procyclical nature of net worth leads the
wedge between the cost of external ¯nance and internal funds, the external ¯nance
premium, to fall during booms and to rise during recessions. Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999, BGG hereafter), and others, including Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), demonstrate that these ¯nancial frictions may sig-
ni¯cantly amplify the magnitude or persistence of °uctuations in economic activity.
Despite this interest among researchers, mainstream macroeconomic models used
for monetary policy analysis, such as the models used by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), contain no role for ¯nancial frictions.
One reason for the omission of ¯nancial frictions from standard models is that
there is little agreement about their importance for business cycle °uctuations. As
a result, quantifying the importance of credit market frictions continues to be the
subject of much research. To this end, we estimate a sticky-price dynamic stochastic
general-equilibrium (DSGE) model similar to that of Ireland (2003), but with the
addition of the ¯nancial friction described in BGG. We investigate whether this ¯-
nancial friction can improve the estimated model's ability to account for key features
of the data, particularly those related to output and investment. We also assess the
nature of the role it plays in the estimated model's dynamics.
Based on earlier work by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), BGG develop a model
in which there is a link between the borrowing costs of ¯rms and their net worth.1
This link has come to be known as the \¯nancial accelerator." In this model, en-
1An alternative approach is to introduce ¯nancial frictions by giving ¯nancial intermediaries
an ability to change credit conditions without a change in borrower creditworthiness. Examples
of these studies are Cook (1999), Cooper and Ejarque (2000), Atta-Mensah and Dib (2003), and
Meh and Moran (2004).
1trepreneurs, who borrow funds to undertake investment projects, face an external
¯nance premium that rises when their leverage increases. A tightening in monetary
policy, for example, reduces the return on capital, in part because the rental rate of
capital falls and in part because of the drop in the value of that capital. The result
is that the net worth of ¯rms, which depends on the return to capital, declines.
Declines in net worth increase ¯rm leverage, leading to tighter ¯nancing conditions.
This reduces the demand for capital, which reinforces the decline in its value. This
mechanism is often called an \accelerator" e®ect, because declines in the net worth
of ¯rms raise the cost of ¯nancing, which has a feedback e®ect on net worth.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) ¯rst demonstrated the quantitative importance of
the Bernanke and Gertler (1989) mechanism, ¯nding that it could produce a hump-
shaped output response to shocks in an otherwise standard real business cycle model.
The propagation brought about by the ¯nancial friction allowed the model to better
match this key feature of the data, but it did not amplify the response of output.
Using a sticky-price model calibrated to post-war U.S. data, BGG show that a
di®erent set-up for the ¯nancial-accelerator mechanism both ampli¯es the impact of
shocks and provides a quantitatively important mechanism that propagates shocks
at business cycle frequencies.2
In this paper, we develop and estimate a sticky-price DSGE model that includes
the ¯nancial-accelerator mechanism proposed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999). The structural parameters of the model, including those related to the ¯nan-
cial accelerator, are estimated econometrically using post-1979 U.S. macroeconomic
data and a maximum-likelihood procedure with a Kalman ¯lter. We also estimate
a constrained version of the model in which the ¯nancial accelerator is turned o®.
Estimating these two versions of the model allows us to econometrically test for
the presence of a ¯nancial-accelerator mechanism using the likelihood-ratio test. To
evaluate the importance of the accelerator, we compare the impulse responses of
key macroeconomic variables generated in models with and without the ¯nancial
2Subsequent work using the BGG model for other countries has provided similar results (see Hall
2001 for the United Kingdom and Fukunaga 2002 for Japan). A number of studies have used this
¯nancial-accelerator mechanism to account for macroeconomic developments at times of ¯nancial
crisis. Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004), Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003), Tovar (2003,
2004), and Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2005) consider the case of open economies in
emerging markets. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004) use the ¯nancial accelerator in their
analysis of the Great Depression in the United States.
2accelerator.
We ¯nd that the estimate of the parameter related to the ¯nancial accelerator
is statistically signi¯cant and larger than in many calibrated studies. The impulse-
response functions show that introducing the ¯nancial accelerator greatly ampli¯es
and propagates the e®ects of all transitory shocks on investment. Its importance for
the ampli¯cation of output °uctuations varies, depending on the nature of the shock
considered. The likelihood-ratio test rejects the basic sticky-price model without the
¯nancial accelerator in favour of the one that includes it.
These ¯ndings contrast with those reported by Meier and Muller (2005), who
consider the role of the BGG-style ¯nancial accelerator in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. They estimate their model by matching impulse responses with
the empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from a vector autore-
gression. Their ¯ndings attribute an important role to capital adjustment costs, but
only a marginal role to the accelerator in explaining the transmission of monetary
policy shocks. As a result, Meier and Muller argue that little is lost if DSGE models
do not incorporate ¯nancial-accelerator e®ects. We ¯nd that the accelerator mech-
anism plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks. In
addition, as Meier and Muller acknowledge, their assessment is based solely on the
accelerator's role in the transmission of monetary shocks. We ¯nd that the acceler-
ator plays a role in explaining the response of macro variables to a variety of other
shocks, particularly an investment-speci¯c technology shock.
The model we develop is based on BGG (1999) and the estimated model of Ire-
land (2003). Ireland's model is based on a relatively standard New Keynesian model
with sticky prices and capital that is very similar to the BGG set-up. This has the
advantage that we can compare our results on the accelerator with BGG, and com-
pare empirical models with that of Ireland (2003). Ireland also uses investment data
in his estimation, which is important in our context, since we are most interested
in the interaction of the price of capital, ¯nancing costs, and investment. Ireland's
(2003) model has the advantage that it uses a general class of monetary policy
rule that embeds a Taylor-type rule. This is useful because the behaviour of the
monetary authorities has an impact on the quantitative importance of the ¯nancial
accelerator. For example, BGG have noted that policy rules that stabilize output
will also counteract, and may eliminate, the impact of the ¯nancial accelerator on
3output or investment (see Fukunaga 2002 for an example).3
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
describes the data and the econometric method used to estimate the models. Section
4 discusses the empirical results and section 5 o®ers some conclusions.
2. The Model
Our basic model is a closed-economy DSGE model similar to that of Ireland (2003).
The key addition to this model is a ¯nancial-accelerator mechanism similar to that
proposed by BGG. As a result, we assume that the economy is characterized by three
types of rigidities: price stickiness, capital adjustment costs, and ¯nancial market
frictions. We also assume that the economy is disturbed by ¯ve transitory shocks:
technology, money demand, monetary policy, preference, and investment e±ciency.
In this model there are three types of producers: entrepreneurs, capital pro-
ducers, and retailers. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods. They borrow
from a ¯nancial intermediary that converts household deposits into business ¯nanc-
ing for the purchase of capital. The presence of asymmetric information between
entrepreneurs and lenders creates a ¯nancial friction that makes entrepreneurial de-
mand for capital depend on their ¯nancial position. Capital producers build new
capital and sell it to entrepreneurs. Changes in the supply of, or demand for, capital
will lead the price of capital to °uctuate and further propagate the shocks. Retailers
set nominal prices in a staggered fashion µ a la Calvo (1983).4 This nominal rigidity
gives monetary policy a role in this model. Our model di®ers from BGG in its char-
acterization of monetary policy by a modi¯ed Taylor-type rule. We assume that the
Federal Reserve adjusts short-term interest rates in response to in°ation, output,
and money-growth changes. In addition, we allow for the possibility of debt de°ation
and a utility function that is non-separable in consumption and real balances.
2.1 Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption, ct; real money bal-
ances, Mt=pt; and leisure, 1 ¡ ht. Its preferences are described by the following
3See BGG (1999). The e®ects of the ¯nancial accelerator may, nonetheless, show up elsewhere,
such as in the size of the monetary policy response required to dampen output °uctuations.







where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, Mt is holdings of nominal money balances,
ht is labour supply, and pt is the consumer price level.5 The single-period utility



















+ ´ log(1 ¡ ht); (2)
where ° and ´ are positive structural parameters that denote the constant elasticity
of substitution between consumption and real balances, and the weight on leisure
in the utility function, respectively. We interpret zt as a taste (preference) shock,
while bt is interpreted as a money-demand shock. These shocks follow ¯rst-order
autoregressive processes:
log(zt) = ½z log(zt¡1) + "zt; (3)
and
log(bt) = (1 ¡ ½b)log(b) + ½b log(bt¡1) + "bt; (4)
where ½z;½b 2 (¡1;1) are autoregressive coe±cients, b is constant, and the seri-
ally uncorrelated shocks "zt and "bt are normally distributed with zero means and
standard deviations ¾z and ¾b, respectively.
The representative household enters period t with dt¡1 units of real deposits
in the ¯nancial intermediary; nominal money balances, Mt¡1; and nominal bonds,
Bt¡1. While deposits, dt, at the ¯nancial intermediary pay the real interest rate, Rt,
money balances, Mt, are money held outside of banks (cash) or savings instruments
that bear low interest, such as chequing accounts.6 During period t, the household
chooses to consume, ct; purchase new government bonds, Bt, for the price 1=Rn
t
(where Rn
t is the riskless nominal interest rate); change nominal money balances,
5It has become standard to introduce money in the utility function to evaluate real balances in
equilibrium, because money is dominated by other assets.
6The real return on bonds and deposits is the same in equilibrium. We introduce nominal
(bonds) and real (deposits) assets to explicity derive the Fisher equation.












ht + dt¡1 +
Mt¡1 + Bt¡1 + Tt + Dt
pt
; (5)
where Tt denotes lump-sum transfers from the monetary authority and Dt refers to
dividend payments received from retailer ¯rms.
























































where ¸t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint and
mt = Mt=pt, wt = Wt=pt, ¼t+1 = pt+1=pt, are, respectively, real money balances, real
wages, and the gross in°ation rate.
2.2 Production sector
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs' behaviour follows that proposed by Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999). Entrepreneurs manage ¯rms that produce wholesale goods and
borrow to ¯nance the capital used in the production process. Entrepreneurs are risk
neutral and have a ¯nite expected horizon for planning purposes. The probability
that an entrepreneur will survive until the next period is º, so the expected lifetime
horizon is 1=(1 ¡ º). This assumption ensures that entrepreneurs' net worth (the
¯rm equity) will never be enough to fully ¯nance the new capital acquisition. In
6essence, they issue debt contracts to ¯nance their desired investment expenditures
in excess of net worth.
At the end of each period, entrepreneurs purchase capital, kt+1, that will be
used in the next period at the price qt. Thus, the cost of the purchased capital is
qtkt+1. The capital acquisition is ¯nanced partly by their net worth, nt+1, and by
borrowing, qtkt+1 ¡ nt+1, from a ¯nancial intermediary. This intermediary obtains
its funds from household deposits and faces an opportunity cost of funds equal to
the economy's nominal riskless rate of return, Rn
t .
The entrepreneurs' demand for capital depends on the expected marginal return
and the expected marginal external ¯nancing cost at t + 1, Etft+1, which equals
the real interest rate on external (borrowed) funds. Consequently, the optimal en-
trepreneurs' capital demand guarantees that
Etft+1 = Et
·




where ± is the capital depreciation rate, while the expected marginal return of capital
is given by the right-side terms of (11), in which rkt+1 is the marginal productivity of
capital at t+1 and (1¡±)qt+1 is the value of one unit of capital used in production
in t + 1.
BGG (1999) assume the existence of an agency problem that makes external
¯nance more expensive than internal funds. The entrepreneurs costlessly observe
their output, which is subject to a random outcome. The ¯nancial intermediaries
incur an auditing cost to observe the output. After observing their project outcome,
entrepreneurs decide whether to repay their debt or to default. If they default,
the ¯nancial intermediaries audit the loan and recover the project outcome, less
monitoring costs.
Accordingly, the marginal external ¯nancing cost is equal to a gross premium
for external funds plus the gross real opportunity costs equivalent to the riskless
interest rate. Thus, the demand for capital should satisfy the following optimality
condition7:
Etft+1 = Et [S(¢)Rt]; (12)
7For more details, see BGG (1999), who derive an optimal contract between entrepreneurs and
¯nancial intermediaries under an asymmetric information problem.
7where EtRt = Et (Rn







with S0(¢) < 0 and S(1) = 1:
The gross external ¯nance premium S(¢) depends on the size of the borrower's
equity stake in a project (or, alternatively, the borrower's leverage ratio). As
nt+1=qtkt+1 falls, the borrower relies on uncollateralized borrowing (higher leverage)
to a larger extent to fund the project. Since this increases the incentive to misreport
the outcome of the project, the loan becomes riskier and the cost of borrowing rises.9
From this relationship, we derive the log-linearized equation for the external
¯nance premium:
^ ft+1 ¡ ^ Rt = ¡Ã^ nt+1 + Ã^ kt+1 + Ã^ qt; (14)
where Ã represents the elasticity of the external ¯nance premium with respect to a
change in the leverage position of entrepreneurs.
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves according to
nt+1 = ºvt + (1 ¡ º)gt; (15)
where vt denotes the net worth of surviving entrepreneurs net of borrowing costs
carried over from the previous period, 1 ¡ º is the share of new entrepreneurs en-
tering the economy, and gt is the transfer or \seed money" that newly entering
entrepreneurs receive from entrepreneurs who die and depart from the scene.10 vt is
given by
vt = [ftqt¡1kt ¡ Et¡1ft(qt¡1kt ¡ nt)]; (16)
where ft is the ex post real return on capital held in t, and Et¡1ft is the cost of
borrowing (the interest rate in the loan contract signed in time t ¡ 1). Earnings
from operations in this period become next period's net worth. In our formulation,
8We derive this equation from (9) and (10), assuming that the covariance of ¸t+1 and ¼t+1
equals zero.
9When the riskiness of loans increases, the agency costs rise and the lender's expected losses
increase. A higher external ¯nance premium paid by successful entrepreneurs o®sets these higher
losses and ensures that there is no change to the return on deposits for households.
10The parameter º will a®ect the persistence of changes in net worth.
8borrowers sign a debt contract that speci¯es a ¯xed nominal interest rate.11 The
loan repayment (in real terms) will then depend on the ex post real interest rate (see
equation (C.17) in Appendix C). An unanticipated increase (decrease) in in°ation
will reduce (increase) the real cost of debt repayment.
To produce output yt, the entrepreneurs use kt units of capital and ht units of




1¡® ; ® 2 (0;1); (17)
where At is a technology shock that is common to all entrepreneurs. The technology
shock At is assumed to follow the autoregressive process
logAt = (1 ¡ ½A)log(A) + ½A log(At¡1) + "At; (18)
where ½a (-1,1), A > 0, and "At is normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation ¾A.
The entrepreneur maximizes pro¯ts by choosing kt and ht subject to the produc-

















where »t > 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the technology function;
»t=¸t is the real marginal cost, MCt=pt; wt is the real wage; and rk
t is the real rental
rate on capital.12
2.2.2 Capital producers
Capital producers use a linear technology to produce capital goods, kt, sold at the
end of period t. They use a fraction of ¯nal goods purchased from retailers as invest-
ment goods, it, and the existing capital stock to produce new capital goods. The
11In BGG, the contract is speci¯ed in terms of the real interest rate.
12We assume that entrepreneurial consumption is small and it drops out of the model.
9new capital goods replace depreciated capital and add to the capital stock. We as-
sume that capital producers are subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs. Their
optimization problem, in real terms, consists of choosing the quantity of investment
















Thus, the optimal condition is
Et
·







which is the standard Tobin's Q equation that relates the price of capital to the
marginal adjustment costs.
The quantity and price of capital are determined in the market for capital. The
entrepreneurial demand curve for capital is determined by equation (11), and the
supply of capital is given by equation (23). The intersection of these curves gives
the quantity and price of capital. Capital adjustment costs slow down the response
of investment to di®erent shocks, which directly a®ects the price of capital.
Furthermore, the aggregate capital stock evolves according to
kt+1 = xtit + (1 ¡ ±)kt; (24)
where ± is the depreciation rate and the disturbance xt is a shock to the marginal
e±ciency of investment (as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu®man 1988).13 Since it
is expressed in consumption units, xt determines the amount of capital in e±ciency
units that can be purchased for one unit of consumption. The xt shock follows the
autoregressive process:
log(xt) = ½x log(xt¡1) + "xt; (25)
where ½x ²(¡1;1) is an autoregressive coe±cient, and "xt is normally distributed
with mean zero and standard deviation ¾x.
13Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) ¯nd that investment-speci¯c technological progress
is a source of about 30 per cent of output °uctuations. They point to the negative co-movement of
the relative price of new capital and equipment investment as motivation for the use of this type
of shock.
102.2.3 Retailers
Retailers purchase the wholesale goods at a price equal to nominal marginal costs,
MCt (the marginal cost in the entrepreneurs' sector),14 and di®erentiate them at
no cost.15 They then sell these di®erentiated retail goods in a monopolistically
competitive market. Following Calvo (1983), we assume that retailers cannot change
their selling prices unless they receive a random signal. The constant probability of
receiving such a signal is (1 ¡ Á). Thus, each retailer, j, sets the price, ¹ pt(j), that



















where the retailer's pro¯t function is
Dt+l(j) = (¹ pt(j) ¡ MCt+l)yt+l(j): (28)











14The entrepreneurs sell their output in a perfectly competitive market, so the price of their
goods equals the marginal cost of production.
15The retail sector is used only to introduce nominal rigidity into this economy.
16Thus, l is the average length of time a price remains unchanged, l = 1=(1 ¡ Á).
17This demand function is derived from the de¯nition of aggregate demand as the composite
of individual ¯nal output (retail) goods and the corresponding price index in the monopolistic

















where yt+l(j) and pt+l(j) are the demand and price faced by each individual retailer, j 2 (0;1).





t¡1 + (1 ¡ Á)¹ p
1¡µ
t : (30)
These equations lead to the following New Keynesian Phillips curve:
Et^ ¼t+1 = ^ ¼t ¡
(1 ¡ ¯Á)(1 ¡ Á)
Á
^ mct; (31)
where mct is real marginal cost, and variables with hats are log deviations from the
steady-state values (such as ^ ¼t = log(¼t=¼)).
2.3 Monetary authority
Following Ireland (2003), the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, Rn
t , in
response to deviations of in°ation (¼t = pt=pt¡1), output (yt), and the money-growth





n) = %¼ log(¼t=¼) + %y log(yt=y) + %¹ log(¹t=¹) + "Rt; (32)
where Rn, ¼, y, and ¹ are the steady-state values of Rn
t , ¼t, yt, and ¹t, respectively,
and "Rt is a monetary policy shock normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation ¾R. The newly created money is transferred to households, so Tt = Mt ¡
Mt¡1.
We choose this policy rule to provide °exibility in the characterization of mon-
etary policy. The policy coe±cients, %¼, %y, and %¹, are chosen by the monetary
authority. In this case, a unique equilibrium exists as long as the sum of %¼ and %¹
exceeds unity. Our modi¯ed Taylor-type rule embeds the standard Taylor (1993)
rule (when %¹ = 0) where the monetary authority changes interest rates in response
to in°ation and output deviations.18 If %¹ is non-zero, monetary policy can be con-
sidered to in°uence a linear combination of the interest rate and money growth to
achieve a target for in°ation. Alternatively, the central bank may simply respond to
18Under the standard Taylor rule, money supply responds passively to the changes in the nominal
interest rates. Thus, money stock is totally determined by the money demand. By reacting to
money growth, the central bank is able to o®set the negative e®ects of money-demand shocks on
economic activity; see Dib (2002).
12money growth because it wishes to insulate the economy from the e®ects of money-
demand shocks or, more simply, because it is an indication of future in°ation.
Since the parameters in this rule are estimated, we let the data decide upon
the best characterization of monetary policy over the 1979 to 2004 period. Es-
timating this rule is important for our exercise, because allowing for a stronger
output-stabilizing response of monetary policy may a®ect our conclusions regarding
the importance of the ¯nancial accelerator. Ireland (2003) estimates this rule using
the same sample and ¯nds evidence that the money-growth term enters signi¯cantly,
but that the coe±cient on output does not. He also ¯nds that his estimated model
can generate the autocorrelation in interest rates observed in the data, despite the
absence of an interest rate smoothing term.
2.4 Symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, all entrepreneurs are identical, so they make the same
decision. In this economy, the symmetric equilibrium consists of an allocation
fyt;ct;mt;it;ht;kt;ntg and a sequence of prices and co-state variables fwt;rkt;Rn
t ;Rt;
ft;qt;¸t;mctg that satisfy the optimality conditions of households, capital producers,
entrepreneurs, and retailers; the money-supply rule; and the stochastic processes for
preferences, money demand, productivity, investment, and monetary policy shocks
(see Appendix A).
Taking a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium system around steady-state
values, and using Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) procedure, yields a state-space so-
lution of the form:
^ st+1 = ©1^ st + ©2"t+1; (33)
^ dt = ©3^ st; (34)
where the state variable vector, ^ st, includes predetermined and exogenous variables;
^ dt is the vector of control variables; and the vector "t contains the random innova-
tions. The coe±cient matrices, ©1;©2, and ©3, have elements that depend on the
structural parameters of the model. Therefore, the state-space solution, (33) and
(34), is used to estimate and simulate the model.
133. Data and Estimation Strategy
As in previous studies that estimate DSGE models using a maximum-likelihood pro-
cedure, some parameters are set prior to estimation because the data used in the
estimations contain little information about them. Thus, the parameter ´, denot-
ing the weight on leisure in the utility function, is set equal to 1.315, so that the
household spends around 33 per cent of its time in market activities. The degree
of retailers' monopoly power, µ, is set equal to 6, which implies a gross steady-state
price markup of 1.20, a common value used in the literature. The depreciation
rate, ±, is assigned the commonly used values of 0.025. The constant associated
with money demand, b, is set to 0.07, to ensure that the steady-state ratio of real
balances to consumption is close to its historical value.
BGG solve a ¯nancial contract that maximizes the payo® to the entrepreneur,
subject to the lender earning the required rate of return. BGG show that|given
parameter values associated with the cost of monitoring the borrower, character-
istics of the distribution of entrepreneurial returns, and the expected life span of
¯rms|their contract implies a steady-state external ¯nance premium and leverage
ratio that are close to long-run historical averages observed in the data.19 The un-
derlying parameter values determine the elasticity of the external ¯nance premium
with respect to ¯rm leverage (Ã, see equation (14)).
In our empirical model, we abstract from the parameters that underpin the
¯nancial contract. We calibrate the steady-state interest rate on external funds
equal to the average of the business prime loan rate over our sample (this gives
a gross external ¯nance premium, S(¢), of about 1.03, or 3.0 per cent annualized
and on a net basis). We set the steady-state capital-to-asset ratio equal to 2. This
implies a ¯rm leverage ratio, de¯ned as the ratio of debt to assets, of 0.5. The
probability that an entrepreneur will survive for the next period, º, is set to 0.9728,
as in BGG (1999), implying that the expected working life of an entrepreneur is 36
years.
We set values for the steady-state external ¯nance premium and the leverage
ratio to historical averages of the same data that BGG try to match. Instead of
¯xing the value of the elasticity (Ã) based on this information, we estimate it using
19For details, see Appendix A of BGG (1999) or the appendix in Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci
(2003).
14aggregate investment and the other macro series in our data set. Our objective is to
determine whether ¯nancing constraints that depend on ¯rm net worth can improve
the ¯t of our model and allow it to match some stylized facts about investment.
The remaining non-calibrated parameters are estimated using a maximum-likelihood
procedure with a Kalman ¯lter. This method applies a Kalman ¯lter to a model's
state-space form to generate series of innovations used to evaluate the likelihood
function for the sample. Because the solution is a state-space econometric model,
driven by ¯ve innovations in "t, the structural parameters embedded in ©1, ©2, and
©3 can be estimated by a maximum-likelihood procedure using data for ¯ve series,
in this case yt, it, ¼t, Rn
t , and mt.20
Using quarterly U.S. data from 1979Q3 through 2004Q3, we estimate two ver-
sions of the model.21 The ¯rst is a model with a ¯nancial accelerator (the FA model).
The second is the same model with the dynamic e®ects of the ¯nancial accelerator
turned o®. In this second model, which we call the Estimated No-FA model, the
parameter that captures the elasticity of the external ¯nance premium with respect
to ¯rm leverage, Ã, is constrained to equal zero.22 See the linearized equations in
Appendix C for more details.
In the U.S. data, output is measured by real GDP excluding government expen-
ditures, since there is no government spending in the model.23 Since the ¯nancial
friction in our model exerts in°uence directly on investment behaviour, we use in-
vestment data in the estimation. In addition, Ireland (2003) argues that investment
data are required because it is insu±cient to use only output data to identify the
parameter of the capital adjustment cost. Investment is measured by real gross
private domestic investment. Real money balances are measured by dividing the
base money stock, M0, by the GDP de°ator.24 These three series are expressed in
20This method is described in Hamilton (1994, chapter 13).
21This period corresponds to the Volcker-Greenspan era at the Federal Reserve, which is often
characterized as a period of relatively constant monetary policy. We can thus avoid the indeter-
minacy problems often found for models estimated with pre-1979 data.
22Both models are estimated with the same steady-state risk premium on external funds. In the
estimated No-FA model, however, the risk premium is constrained to equal its steady-state value,
rather than °uctuate with changes in ¯rm net worth over the cycle.
23To construct the output series used in the estimation, we subtract government spending from
the aggregate data on U.S. nominal GDP.
24We also conducted the estimation exercise with M1 as an alternative measure of money and
found similar qualitative results.
15per capita terms using the civilian population aged 16 and over. The in°ation rate
is measured by changes in the GDP implicit price de°ator, while the short-term
nominal interest rate is measured by the rate on three-month treasury bills. All the
series are HP-¯ltered before the estimation, including in°ation and interest rates,
because they exhibit a small downward trend over the post-1979 sample.25
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1 reports the maximum-likelihood estimates and standard errors of the FA and
Estimated No-FA model's structural parameters for the period 1979Q3 to 2004Q3.
The estimate of the parameter Ã, the elasticity of the external ¯nance premium
with respect to ¯rm leverage, is statistically signi¯cant and equal to 0.092. This
estimate is higher than values usually used to calibrate this parameter in models
with a ¯nancial accelerator. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (2000) set Ã to 0.05,
about half of our estimated value. Meier and Muller (2005) report an estimated value
of 0.067 for this parameter, but the estimate is not statistically signi¯cant.
The di®erence in parameter estimates associated with capital adjustment costs
and the monetary policy rule across the two models also suggests that the accelera-
tor mechanism is helping the models to account for °uctuations in investment. The
capital adjustment cost parameter, Â, is 1.43 in the FA model, more than double
the 0.64 estimated in the Estimated No-FA model. These estimates are consider-
ably higher than the 0.25 value for the adjustment cost parameter used by BGG.
Meier and Muller report an estimate of 0.65, below that in our FA model. Using
a similar econometric methodology, however, Ireland (2001, 2003) ¯nds estimates
of the adjustment cost parameter that are much larger.26 Capital adjustment costs
have an important interaction with the ¯nancial-accelerator mechanism. If capital
adjustment costs are high, the price of capital will respond to shocks to a greater
extent. The price of capital has a direct e®ect on the net worth of ¯rms (through
capital gains and losses) and therefore on the cost of external ¯nancing. The higher
25In future work, we will consider the robustness of our results to alternative ¯ltering procedures,
such as linearizing around a linear deterministic trend or using a common stochastic trend.
26The estimated value for Â in Ireland (2003), in the post-1979 sample, is 32.1 in the sticky-price
model, while it is 17.4 in the °exible-price model.
16capital adjustment costs in the FA model suggest that the FA mechanism may be
helping to generate investment volatility.
In both models, estimates of the policy rule parameters indicate that, since 1979,
the Fed has responded much more strongly to in°ation deviations than to output
or money-growth °uctuations. This is particularly true for the FA model, which
suggests a more aggressive response of monetary policy to in°ation deviations than
in the estimated No-FA model. The estimate of %¼, the coe±cient that measures
the response of monetary policy to in°ation deviations, is 1.94 in the FA model, but
much less, 0.91, in the estimated No-FA model. The estimates of %y are small, but
statistically signi¯cant, and take the expected sign in both models. The estimated
value of %¹, the weight on money-growth deviations, is 0.41 in the FA model, but a
much smaller 0.15 in the estimated No-FA model. The estimates of all the monetary
policy rule parameters are statistically di®erent from zero.
The larger estimated coe±cients for the monetary policy rule in the model with
a ¯nancial accelerator are not surprising. The presence of the ¯nancial accelerator
leads to an ampli¯cation and propagation of the impacts of the shocks on output,
in°ation, and money growth. Thus, the monetary authority needs to respond more
aggressively to changes in these variables to control in°ation than it would if there
were no ¯nancial accelerator.
The estimate of ° implies that money demand has an interest elasticity of -0.026,
which is very close to the values estimated in Ireland (2003) for the post-1979 period.
The estimate of the capital share in the production function, ®, is close to 0.33, the
value often assumed in the literature. The estimate of Á, the probability that prices
remain unchanged for the next period, is about 0.5 in both models. This indicates
that ¯rms set prices for about two quarters, on average.27 Thus, prices are quite
°exible compared with other estimated DSGE models that have Calvo pricing.
We next examine the estimated shock processes. The investment-e±ciency shock
stands out in both models as having the largest volatility, but less so in the FA model.
We therefore ¯nd that large investment shocks are important for the empirical model
to explain the co-movement of investment and the other variables in the post-1979
data. Ireland's (2003) ¯ndings are similar, and he argues that large investment
shocks are required for the model to explain the investment boom of the 1990s.
27Prices are somewhat stickier in BGG, with Á = 0.75, implying an average period of four
quarters between price adjustments.
17There is a notable di®erence in the estimated persistence of the shocks across
models. The estimates for the No-FA model show that the investment e±ciency and
preference shocks are highly persistent, while the estimates for the FA model are less
so. In fact, all of the shocks are less persistent in the FA model, possibly because of
the added propagation e®ects from net worth that the accelerator mechanism brings
to the model.
Do the dynamic e®ects associated with °uctuations in net worth and the risk
premium allow the FA model to better capture the co-movement in the data? We
use the likelihood-ratio test to test the restriction imposed by the estimated No-
FA model (Ã = 0) against the model with the ¯nancial accelerator (FA model).
Let Lu and Lc denote the maximum values of the log-likelihood function for the
unconstrained (FA) and constrained (estimated No-FA) models, respectively. The
likelihood-ratio statistic ¡2(Lc ¡ Lu) has a chi-square distribution with one degree
of freedom under the null hypothesis that the No-FA is valid. The value of Lu
is 1896.8 and that of Lc is 1871.4, giving a test statistic of 50.8. The 1 per cent
critical value for a Â2(1) is 6.64. Therefore, the likelihood-ratio test easily rejects
the restriction of the estimated No-FA model in favour of the model that includes a
¯nancial accelerator. The introduction of the accelerator mechanism improves the
model's ability to capture the co-movement in the data.28
4.2 Impulse responses
We compare the responses of various macroeconomic variables with the ¯ve di®erent
shocks when the ¯nancial accelerator is present and when it is not. Figures 1 to
5, respectively, show the impulse responses to a 1 per cent shock to the short-term
nominal interest rate (tightening of monetary policy), technology (increase in At),
money demand (increase in bt), preferences for consumption (increase in zt a®ecting
the marginal utility of consumption), and the e±ciency of investment (increase in
xt). Each variable's response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its
steady-state level, with the exception of rate variables, which are in percentage
points (e.g., a 0.1 increase in ^ Rn
t is an increase of 10 basis points).
28This is not an empirical test for the existence of a ¯nancial friction: one must exist in both
models, because the steady-state cost of external funds exceeds the risk-free rate. This is a test
of the extent to which such a friction improves the model's ability to account for the dynamics of
macrovariables observed in the data.
18In Figures 1 to 5, the impulse responses generated in the estimated FA model are
shown in red. The dashed lines (in blue) show impulse responses when the dynamic
e®ects of the ¯nancial accelerator are not present. They are the impulse responses
generated by setting Ã equal to 0, but keeping all of the other parameter estimates
from the FA model. We call this the No-FA model. The di®erence between the red
and blue lines should indicate the impact of the accelerator mechanism on a given
variable after a particular shock. Since the likelihood-ratio test rejects the estimated
model in which Ã is constrained to equal zero, its impulse responses are not shown.
Figure 1 shows that the presence of a ¯nancial accelerator both ampli¯es and
propagates the impact of a positive 1 per cent monetary policy shock on real vari-
ables, particularly for investment. Despite the fact that the shock lasts for only
one period, deviations of investment, output, and hours are long-lived.29 The basic
mechanism of the ¯nancial accelerator is evident in the impulse responses. After a
tightening in monetary policy, net worth falls, because of the declining return to capi-
tal and the higher real interest costs associated with existing debt (the debt-de°ation
e®ect). The external ¯nance premium rises, re°ecting the increase in ¯rm leverage.
The higher funding cost of purchasing new capital depresses the demand for it, and
the expected price of capital persists below its steady-state value. These impulse
responses show considerably more ampli¯cation of the response of investment than
reported in Meier and Muller (2005), re°ecting, in part, the higher estimated values
that we ¯nd for Ã and Â.
Figure 2 shows that, following a 1 per cent positive technology shock, there is an
important ampli¯cation of investment, but no ampli¯cation of the output response
when the ¯nancial accelerator is present. The impact on output, investment, and
hours lingers in the FA model responses. The technology shock increases the return
to capital, pushing up net worth. The small decline in in°ation that results from
the shock increases the real cost of repaying existing debt, dampening slightly the
rise of net worth. The positive impact on net worth from the higher return to
capital dominates, due in part to the endogenous policy response that reduces the
disin°ationary impact, and net worth rises. Higher net worth decreases the external
¯nance premium and increases the demand for capital. The response of investment
to the shock is much larger when the FA is present. As is often found in sticky-
29The persistence of the decrease in output following a monetary policy shock is due to the
persistence of the investment response.
19price models, hours worked declines after the technology shock, since the wealth
e®ect from higher marginal product of labour outweighs the substitution e®ect.
The decline in hours worked, however, is not very di®erent in the FA and No-FA
cases.
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to a positive 1 per cent money-demand
shock. As the demand for real balances rises, consumption and savings falls, de-
pressing output and investment. In addition, with less output being produced, but
more liquidity expected in the economy, in°ation rises. The monetary authority
responds with higher interest rates and an increased supply of money, since the
interest elasticity of money demand is small. In the FA model, the initial drop in
the return to capital has a larger impact on output and investment, owing to the
accelerator e®ects.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a positive 1 per cent shock to the
marginal utility of consumption and real balances. The presence of a ¯nancial
accelerator dampens the impact of the shock slightly from the No-FA case, due to its
in°uence on investment, which declines more sharply when the accelerator is present
(consumption is almost identical in the two cases). The preference shock initially
raises the marginal utility of consumption and therefore the opportunity cost of
holding deposits (savings). As households divert deposits towards consumption, the
return on deposits (the risk-free real interest rate) rises. In the accelerator model,
the rise in this interest rate has a larger e®ect on investment, due to its impact on
¯rms' net worth.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to an investment-e±ciency shock, which
enables us to show how the investment shock interacts with the ¯nancial-accelerator
mechanism in this model. The investment shock is a persistent positive shock to
the marginal e±ciency with which investment goods are turned into capital. Im-
pulse responses from the FA model show that, after such a shock, investment drops
sharply but the capital stock increases: because of the higher marginal e±ciency of
investment, there are more e®ective units of capital, despite a decline in the amount
of investment goods. Investment falls because the future marginal product of capital
declines and capital adjustment costs increase as the capital stock rises. In the FA
model, the decline in investment is more pronounced.30 The rise in the supply of
30The instantaneous negative responses of output, hours, and investment to the investment shock
in the No-FA model are explained by the high persistence of the investment-e±ciency shock. If
20capital reduces its price. The replacement cost of existing capital falls, lowering the
return on capital and hence net worth. The resulting rise in the external ¯nance
premium raises the cost of funding investment purchases even higher. The fact that
a positive productivity shock to investment causes an increase in the risk premium
may be particular to the form of capital adjustment costs in the model.
As in previous studies, the FA ampli¯es and propagates the impact of the shocks
on investment. The importance of the FA for output °uctuations, however, depends
on the type of shock. For the monetary policy, money-demand, and investment-
e±ciency shocks, the initial impact on output is double (or more) when the FA is
present. The FA, however, has no impact on the initial response of output after a
technology shock, although the e®ects are more persistent. In the case of the shock
to the marginal utility of consumption, output actually responds less when the FA
is present.
4.3 Volatility and autocorrelation
To assess the contribution of the accelerator mechanism in our estimated model, we
consider the model-implied volatilities and autocorrelations of the main variables
of interest. Table 2 reports the volatilities of output, investment, money growth,
interest rates, and in°ation from the ¯ltered data, and for simulated versions of
the FA model with the accelerator active (FA) and with it turned o® (No-FA).31
The standard deviations are expressed in percentage terms. In the data, investment
is about 5 times as volatile as output: the standard deviation of output is 1.04
and investment is 5.6. Money growth has a standard deviation of 0.85 per cent.
The short-term nominal interest rate and in°ation are less volatile; their standard
deviations are 0.31 per cent and 0.21 per cent, respectively.
The simulation results show that, in the model where the accelerator is active,
output volatility is close to that in the data. The model in which the accelerator
is inactive overpredicts output volatility, however, a feature common in sticky-price
models.
Both of the models overpredict the volatility of investment, but not the ratio of
investment volatility to output volatility. Investment is almost 9 times as volatile as
we lower the persistence of this shock closer to the estimate in Ireland (2003), output, hours, and
investment respond positively to the shock.
31In the data, all series are HP-¯ltered before calculating their standard deviations.
21output, in the FA model, compared with about 5 times in the data. In the model
with the FA inactive, investment is not even twice as volatile as output.
The FA model that contains an extra friction meant to amplify and propagate
shocks shows less output volatility. At the bottom of Table 2, we report the volatility
of output and investment with the investment shock shut o®, to gain insight into its
contribution to these ¯ndings. Investment volatility in the FA model becomes much
larger than in the No-FA model, suggesting that the accelerator is amplifying the
e®ects of other shocks on investment.
The FA and No-FA models are relatively successful at replicating the volatility
of money growth, but they overpredict the volatility of nominal interest rates. Both
models also increase the volatility of in°ation by greater than the amount shown in
the data.
Figure 6 plots the autocorrelation functions for output, investment, nominal in-
terest rates, in°ation, and real balances generated by our models and in the data.
The model with the active FA mechanism does a better job at matching the auto-
correlations shown in the data. It does a good job of matching the autocorrelation
in in°ation and the nominal interest rate within a four-quarter horizon. Output and
investment in the FA model, however, are still much more highly autocorrelated than
in the data. Nonetheless, the presence of the ¯nancial-accelerator mechanism greatly
reduces the autocorrelation in output and investment. Both models generate too
little autocorrelation in real balances relative to the data. Output is more persistent
in the estimated No-FA model, because the estimated autoregressive coe±cients of
all the shocks are larger than in the FA model.
4.4 Variance decompositions
We next consider the forecast-error variance decompositions for output, investment,
money growth, nominal interest rates, and in°ation from the FA model with and
without the active ¯nancial accelerator. Tables 3 and 4 show the forecast-error vari-
ance decompositions of the variables attributed to each of the ¯ve shocks for one- and
ten-quarter-ahead horizons, respectively. In the ¯nancial-accelerator model, tech-
nology, preference, and investment-e±ciency shocks account for the bulk of output
°uctuations. Of these three shocks, only investment e±ciency has important di®er-
ences in the initial response of output when the accelerator mechanism is present.
The ampli¯cation of this shock is therefore the main reason for the increase in the
22forecast-error variance at short horizons. When the accelerator is turned o®, pref-
erence shocks alone account for about half of the output °uctuations.32 Without
the accelerator, investment-e±ciency shocks contribute to output °uctuations only
at longer horizons.
Monetary policy shocks account for a small fraction of the variance in output
and investment in either model, as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) ¯nd.
However, monetary policy shocks account for a larger share of the one-quarter-ahead
output variance when the accelerator is active. Policy shocks also have e®ects on
output °uctuatons at longer horizons in the presence of the accelerator. For example,
monetary policy shocks account for over 5.2 per cent of ten-quarter-ahead forecast
variance error of output in the FA model, but less than 1 per cent in the absence of
the accelerator.
In both models, most of the °uctuation in investment is explained by investment-
e±ciency shocks, particularly in the presence of the ¯nancial accelerator, where
investment shocks account for 96 per cent of the variance. This suggests that the
models on their own, even with the ¯nancial-accelerator mechanism, require large
shocks to account for the co-movement of the investment data with data on output,
in°ation, interest rates, and money growth.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a standard sticky-price model with the addition of a
¯nancial friction along the lines of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist's (1999) ¯nan-
cial accelerator. Our objectives are to determine whether the ¯nancial-accelerator
mechanism can improve the sticky-price model's ability to ¯t post-1979 U.S. data,
and to assess the nature of the mechanism's role in the estimated model's dynamics.
Using a maximum-likelihood procedure with a Kalman ¯lter, we estimate two
versions of the model: one with and one without the ¯nancial accelerator. The
estimated value of a key parameter in the accelerator mechanism, the elasticity of
the external ¯nance premium with respect to ¯rm leverage, is statistically signi¯-
cant and higher than values found in other empirical work or typical calibrations.
A likelihood-ratio test ¯nds an improvement in the model's ¯t with the data when
32This ¯nding is di®erent from that of Ireland (2003), where most of the output °uctuations are
attributed to investment shocks.
23the ¯nancial accelerator is active. In our empirical model, the ¯nancial accelerator
ampli¯es and propagates the investment response to all of the transitory shocks con-
sidered. Its importance for the ampli¯cation of output responses varies, depending
on the nature of the shock considered. Overall, the presence of the ¯nancial accel-
erator increases the variance of output at short horizons. We ¯nd that monetary
policy shocks play a small role in output °uctuations in all of the models considered.
However, the presence of the accelerator extends the horizon over which monetary
policy shocks play a role in output °uctuations.
While these results are encouraging, the empirical model still requires large and
persistent investment-e±ciency shocks to ¯t the data. This suggests that one av-
enue for future model development should explore alternative formulations for the
elements of the model related to investment. In addition, since both the accelerator
mechanism and the investment-e±ciency shock alter the relative price of consump-
tion to investment, it will be important to test the robustness of these results in
models where there is no investment-e±ciency shock. Another useful extension to
the model would be to explore other utility functions that make households less
willing or able to substitute consumption intertemporally, since this could a®ect the
impact of the accelerator on aggregate output. This might be achieved by house-
holds themselves facing a ¯nancial friction. Finally, future work should consider
whether aggregate ¯nancial data can be used in the estimation to make a stronger
link between our ¯ndings and ¯rm ¯nancing.
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26Table 1: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates: 1979Q3 to 2004Q3
FA model No-FA model
Parameters Estimates Std. errors Estimates Std. errors
Ã 0.0922 0.0102 - -
® 0.3412 0.0382 0.3234 0.0390
° 0.0267 0.0048 0.0195 0.0034
Â 1.4264 0.5809 0.6428 0.3719
Á 0.4939 0.0091 0.4816 0.0731
%¼ 1.9440 0.2616 0.9141 0.0425
%y 0.0836 0.0256 0.0466 0.0188
%¹ 0.4157 0.0502 0.1518 0.0320
¾R 0.0050 0.0007 0.0033 0.0003
½A 0.7599 0.0623 0.8502 0.0869
¾A 0.0060 0.0008 0.0033 0.0007
½b 0.6177 0.0531 0.8351 0.0623
¾b 0.0101 0.0004 0.0085 0.0008
½z 0.6684 0.0597 0.9565 0.0148
¾z 0.0086 0.0008 0.0137 0.0017
½x 0.8877 0.0364 0.9798 0.0251
¾x 0.0841 0.0147 0.1207 0.0318
LL 1896.8 1871.4
27Table 2: Standard Deviations: Data and Models (in per cent)
Variables Data FA model FA model, Ã = 0
yt 1.55 1.22 4.85
it 6.54 10.78 8.54
¹t 0.85 0.87 0.91
Rn
t 0.31 0.42 0.43
¼t 0.21 0.28 0.39
Excluding investment shock
yt 1.04 0.99 0.74
it 5.61 2.47 0.62
Table 3: One-Quarter-Ahead Forecast-Error Variance Decompositions
Percentage owing to
Variable Variance Technology Money demand Policy Preference Investment
Financial-accelerator model
yt 0.0036 26.4 4.4 6.7 26.3 36.1
it 0.1724 1.5 0.1 1.5 0.9 96.0
¹t 0.0055 16.9 2.0 25.4 11.9 43.8
Rn
t 0.0009 0.1 50.1 7.2 42.4 0.2
¼t 0.0004 11.4 13.9 27.1 32.7 14.8
Financial-accelerator model (Ã = 0)
yt 0.0023 40.6 2.3 3.9 52.5 0.7
it 0.0054 7.9 0.4 0.8 8.8 82.0
¹t 0.0071 46.3 42.5 9.6 1.2 0.5
Rn
t 0.0004 10.8 25.9 4.5 54.7 4.1
¼t 0.0005 40.5 5.1 42.9 9.7 1.8
28Table 4: Ten-Quarter-Ahead Forecast-Error Variance Decompositions
Percentage owing to
Variable Variance Technology Money demand Policy Preference Investment
Financial-accelerator model
yt 0.0087 38.4 2.2 5.2 17.6 36.6
it 0.9072 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.5 96.5
¹t 0.0399 9.5 1.6 3.6 3.4 81.9
Rn
t 0.0016 1.2 42.1 4.2 45.8 6.6
¼t 0.0007 7.2 33.9 16.6 27.8 14.5
Financial-accelerator model (Ã = 0)
yt 0.0111 26.2 0.5 0.8 18.3 54.2
it 0.0165 9.0 0.1 0.3 5.9 84.7
¹t 0.0252 45.4 26.4 2.8 0.9 24.5
Rn
t 0.0008 22.3 16.7 2.4 52.7 5.9
¼t 0.0006 36.3 10.2 36.9 11.4 5.2

































































Notes: Responses from the FA model are shown by the solid red line and re-
sponses from the No-FA model are shown by the dashed blue line. The responses
are percentage deviations of a variable from its steady-state values, except for vari-
ables that are rates (denoted by ppts). In this case, the lines represent the change
in the rate in percentage points.
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Notes: These plots show the autocorrelation functions for each variable implied
by the three models considered (dashed red line, FA; dot-dashed blue line, No-FA;
and dotted blue line, Estimated No-FA) and calculated using HP-¯ltered data in
the 1979Q3 to 2004Q3 sample (green line).






















































































Etnt+1 = º [ftqt¡1kt ¡ Et¡1ft(qt¡1kt ¡ nt)] + (1 ¡ º)gt; (A.14)
kt+1 = xtit + (1 ¡ ±)kt; (A.15)





















¹t = mt¼t=mt¡1: (A.18)
36Appendix B: The Steady-State Equilibrium
¹ = ¼ = 1; (B.1)






n = 1=¯; (B.4)
f = rk + 1 ¡ ±; (B.5)
f = S(¢)R; (B.6)


















































37Appendix C: The Log-Linearized Equilibrium




^ bt + (° ¡ 1) ^ mt
´
¡ °^ zt; (C.1)





h^ ht=(1 ¡ h) ¡ ^ wt = ^ ¸t; (C.3)
^ yt = ^ At + ®^ kt + (1 ¡ ®)^ ht; (C.4)
y^ yt = c^ ct + i^ it; (C.5)
^ wt = ^ yt + ^ mct ¡ ^ ht; (C.6)
^ rkt = ^ yt + ^ mct ¡ ^ kt; (C.7)
^ ¹t = ^ mt ¡ ^ mt¡1 + ^ ¼t (C.8)
^ R
n
t = %¼^ ¼t + %¹^ ¹t + %y^ yt + "Rt; (C.9)







^ qt = Â(^ it ¡ ^ kt); (C.11)
¯^ ¼t+1 = ^ ¼t ¡
(1 ¡ ¯Á)(1 ¡ Á)
Á
^ mct; (C.12)
^ ¸t+1 = ^ ¸t ¡ ^ Rt; (C.13)
^ ¼t+1 = ^ R
n
t ¡ ^ Rt; (C.14)
^ kt+1 = ±^ it + ±^ xt + (1 ¡ ±)^ kt; (C.15)




























¡ 1) + 1
¶
^ nt: (C.17)
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